OpenSSL v1.1.1.b Release Notes

Release Date: 2019-05-28 // almost 2 years ago
    • Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.

    This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option 'enable-buildtest-c++'.

    Richard Levitte

    • Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.

    Patrick Steuer

    • Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024. This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.

    Kurt Roeckx

    • Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES, EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.

    Paul Yang, Joshua Lock

    • Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()

    Matt Caswell

    • Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.

    Lorinczy Zsigmond

    • Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.

    Richard Levitte

    • Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.

    Bernd Edlinger

    • Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.

    ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored.

    It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce.

    Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

    This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk Greef of Ronomon. [CVE-2019-1543][]

    Matt Caswell

    • Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems

    On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available, OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG. Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet.

    To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to become readable before reading from /dev/urandom.

    • Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm

    Paul Yang